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Introduction  
In July 2020, the United States Supreme Court held that a significant portion of eastern 
Oklahoma, a state in the United States of America, remains Indian Country. By a 5-4 
decision, it held that Congress never disestablished the Muscogee Creek Reservation, which, 
along with other reservations, covers approximately 19 million acres, or one-fifth of the 
landmass of Aotearoa New Zealand. This case has attracted significant attention. TulsaWorld, 
a newspaper from Tulsa, Oklahoma, reported that it “is the most important decision in 
Oklahoma history in terms of sovereignty for the state of Oklahoma and sovereignty for the 
five tribes”.1 For The Atlantic, Julian Brave NoiseCat wrote that McGirt v Oklahoma “might 
be one of the most important Supreme Court cases of all time”.2  
This case note describes why McGirt is significant, but also why it might not be “one of the 
most important Supreme Court cases of all time”. Justice Gorsuch, a Trump appointee, 
authored the majority decision, which Justices Ginsburg, Beyer, Sotomayor and Kagan 
joined. Chief Justice Roberts authored the dissent, which Justices Alito and Kavanaugh 
joined. Justice Thomas agreed with the dissent but authored a separate opinion. Although the 
result of McGirt is beneficial for the tribes and there is an abundance of modish rhetoric, the 
method of arriving at that decision has raised eyebrows. As NoiseCat notes, “what is most 
intriguing is the way the Court arrived at this decision. Gorsuch, a westerner with experience 
in Indian law, who is no liberal, applied a conservative textualist approach to the reading of 
treaty law and statutes.”3 
At issue in McGirt is the State of Oklahoma’s jurisdiction to convict Jimcy McGirt. To 
understand the claim, why it is so significant, and why the legal method of the majority might 
be problematic requires some familiarity with the background of the case as well as United 
States Federal Indian Law.  
Background 
In 1997, the State of Oklahoma convicted and sentenced Mr McGirt to 1,000 years plus life 
in prison for, what the Court calls, “serious sexual offenses.”4 Following a 10th Circuit 
decision, Murphy v Royal,5 McGirt raised a pro se appeal of his conviction. On appeal to the 
United States Supreme Court, Murphy was left undecided, and it is presumed that the Justices 
came to a 4-4 conclusion after Justice Gorsuch recused himself.6 Mirroring the Murphy 
litigation, McGirt argued that the State of Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction to try or 
convict him, because the federal Major Crimes Act 18 USC § 1153 (‘MCA’) provides the 
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Federal Government with the exclusive jurisdiction for all major crimes on Indian Country. 
Hence, when appealed through Oklahoma’s court system to the Supreme Court, the McGirt 
decision also resolved Murphy.  
In some sense, McGirt’s argument is somewhat like the defendant’s argument in Berkett v 
Tauranga District Court.7 In both, a criminal defendant argued that a state lacks jurisdiction 
to prosecute them. The main difference between these cases is the existence of a federal 
structure. Based on the 10th Circuit’s holdings in Murphy, McGirt argued that the State of 
Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction because the Federal government did, as codified in the 
MCA. The overarching question was not, like Berkett, whether the courts have jurisdiction 
over an Indigenous person, but whether McGirt’s criminal actions were on a reservation and, 
therefore, under exclusive federal jurisdiction. Whether McGirt’s acts occurred on a 
reservation and would therefore fall under federal jurisdiction involves a complex and fraught 
history.  
In 1832, the Creek Nation entered into a Treaty with the United States. Essentially, the Creek 
and several other tribes were forced to exchange their ancestral lands in current day Georgia 
and Alabama with lands “west of the Mississippi”.8 The United States’ forced removal of the 
Muscogee Creek, along with the Cherokee, Seminole, Chickasaw, Choctaw and Ponca 
peoples to (contemporary) northeastern Oklahoma is infamously known as the Trail of Tears. 
In 1856 and 1866, the United States entered into treaties with the Creek Nation, which 
promised them a “permanent home” and a right of self-government, but reduced the size of 
land set aside for the Creek.9 The jurisdictional issues in McGirt revolve around the 
consequences of those treaties, as well as some late 19th Century legislation that subsumed 
tribes to Congressional Plenary powers (United States terminology that is akin to 
‘parliamentary sovereignty’). It developed through a series of Acts and cases that are directly 
relevant to McGirt.  
In 1883, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government did not have jurisdiction to try 
a Native American man accused of murdering another on a reservation.10 In response, 
Congress passed the MCA in 1885 to give the federal courts jurisdiction over ‘major crimes’, 
including Indian-on-Indian crimes on Indian Country, which includes on reservations. In US 
v Kagama, the Supreme Court affirmed Congress’s plenary authority to pass that 
legislation.11 The decision created Congressional Plenary power over Indian tribes on the 
basis that tribes are domestic dependent nations, as Cherokee Nation established.12 That 
enabled Congress to pass the General Allotment Act or “Dawes Act” in 1887. The ‘plenary 
power’ of Congress was upheld in Lone Wolf v Hitchcock, finding that Congress has the 
unilateral authority to abrogate treaty obligations with tribes.13 It held that the “authority over 
the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the 
                                                 
7 Berkett v Tauranga District Court [1992] 3 NZLR 206 (HC).  
8 Treaty with the Creeks, arts 1 and 14, 7 Stat 366 at 368 (1832). 
9 McGirt v Oklahoma, above n 4, at 2461. 
10 Ex Parte Kan-gi-shun-ca (Crow Dog) 109 US 556 (1883). 
11 US v Kagama 118 US 375 (1886).  
12 Cherokee Nation v Georgia 30 US 1 (1831). 
13 Lonewolf v Hitchcock 187 US 553 (1903). 
power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the juridical 
department of the government”.14 
McGirt argued that his criminal action occurred on a reservation and was, therefore, subject 
to the Federal jurisdiction. That argument is consistent with the legal history of the United 
States’ subsuming of tribes to Congress’s plenary authority. The main question was whether 
Mr McGirt’s actions occurred on a reservation or the Reservation was somehow 
disestablished so that the MCA would not apply in Oklahoma.15   
The parties did not dispute that McGirt’s crimes were committed on lands described as the 
Creek Reservation in treaties and statute,16 or that “Indian Country” includes “all land within 
the limits of any Indian reservation”.17 However, if a reservation has been diminished, then 
land owned by non-members within the historic boundaries of a reservation is no longer 
Indian Country. Similarly, land is no longer considered Indian Country where a reservation 
has been entirely disestablished. The dispute in McGirt is whether the lands described as the 
Creek Reservation under the treaties and federal statute are reservation lands today and, 
hence, considered Indian Country for purposes of the MCA. If those lands remain Creek 
Reservation, then the MCA applies and the State of Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction to 
prosecute Mr McGirt for his crimes.  
The McGirt Case 
Writing on behalf of the Court, Justice Gorsuch notes that multiple treaties established the 
Creek Reservation and, in an analysis that is consistent with Kagama and Lone Wolf, states 
that only Congress has the power to abrogate treaties or break promises enacted in 
legislation.18 It also noted precedent that Congress must legislatively express its intention to 
disestablish a reservation.19 This indicates that without legislation expressing Congress’s 
intention to disestablish the Reservation, the Creek Reservation exists, and the State of 
Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction to prosecute Mr McGirt.   
After holding that the relevant legislation had not explicitly disestablished the Creek 
Reservation the Court considered Oklahoma’s six counter-arguments. The first four revolved 
around the establishment or disestablishment of the Creek Reservation, while the final two 
focused on the MCA. The Court did not accept any of them.  
Oklahoma’s first argument was that when Congress passed the Allotment Acts, including the 
Dawes Act, it forced the tribes to abandon their communal lifestyles and parceled lands into 
smaller lots. Allotment occurred in the 1890s and early 1900s, which is after the relevant 
treaties. But the Court held that passing laws for allotment failed to disestablish the Creek 
Reservation.20 For Justice Gorsuch, allotment laws provided tribal members with the ability 
to sell lands and opened reservations to settlement. Importantly, the statutes at issue do not 
state that the reservation is disestablished. Even if allotment was the first step in a plan that 
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“ultimately aimed at disestablishment”, Gorsuch writes “wishes are not laws, future plans 
aren’t either. Congress may have passed allotment laws to create the conditions for 
disestablishment. But to equate allotment with disestablishment would confuse the first step 
of a march with arrival at its destination.”21 
Oklahoma’s second argument was that Congress intruded on Indian rights when it abolished 
tribal courts and cut away their autonomy, which was claimed as proof of disestablishment.22 
The Court agreed that Congress had intruded on those rights, but those intrusions do not 
necessarily or fully eliminate tribal interests in land or disestablish a reservation.23 
Throughout the early 1900s, the United States cut away at the Tribe’s authority, but by the 
1930s Congress authorised the Creek to adopt a constitution and bylaws, which the Creek 
did.24 That matters as it shows how the history of Tribal and United States relations is more 
complicated than Oklahoma or the dissent maintain. At one time, Congress explicitly pursued 
tribal termination, but the Federal government later embraced Tribal self-determination 
without termination. Since then, the Creek Nation has ratified a new constitution and 
established a self-governing democracy within the United States.25 Congress did not dissolve 
the Tribe or disestablish the Reservation even if, at times, the United States took steps 
towards disestablishment of the Reservation and termination of the Tribe. 
Oklahoma’s third argument was that historical and demographic practices prove 
disestablishment of the Reservation.26 Essentially, Oklahoma argued that after the formation 
of the State of Oklahoma, people did not act or believe that the Reservation existed. The 
problem for the Court, as Justice Gorsuch articulated, is that those extratextual considerations 
are irrelevant since they should only be considered when statutes are ambiguous. Here, the 
terms of the statutes are clear.27 So even if some people or a majority of the population 
believed that the Creek Reservation was disestablished and that Oklahoma has always 
disregarded the authority of the MCA, or that now there is a “vibrant city with expanding 
aerospace, healthcare, technology, manufacturing and transportation sectors”, that does not 
mean the Reservation is gone.28 Oklahoma overstepped its authority in not applying the 
MCA, white people moved onto the Reservation, and Creek believed the United States 
threatened their Reservation. These events, however, never disestablished the Reservation.29  
Oklahoma’s fourth argument was that Congress never established a reservation. Instead, 
Congress created a “dependent Indian community” when it granted the tribe fee simple rather 
than inalienable land.30 Even if Congress granted the tribe fee simple rather than inalienable 
land, the Court maintained that granting fee simple in lands would still be Indian Country and 
that there are no required words to establish a reservation.31 Furthermore, to believe 
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otherwise would “require us to stand willfully blind before a host of federal statutes” 
recognising the status of the Reservation.32  
The fifth and sixth arguments were not about the status of the Reservation but focused on 
whether the MCA applied in Oklahoma. The fifth argument is that the MCA, as a practical 
matter, never applied in Oklahoma due to the language of the Oklahoma Enabling Act of 
1906 (the Act that formed the State).33 Oklahoma argued that enforcing it now would create a 
gap in jurisdictional powers between federal/state/tribal jurisdictions. On the contrary, the 
Court held that the MCA applied when Oklahoma achieved statehood, even if Oklahoma 
never complied with it.34  
Oklahoma’s sixth and final argument was a policy argument.35 It argued that enforcing the 
MCA now would unsettle an untold number of convictions and it would frustrate the State’s 
ability to prosecute crimes. It also argued that if the Court found that Congress had not 
disestablished the Reservations, other tribes might seek to enforce treaty promises and that 
almost half of Oklahoma’s non-Indian residents might, without their knowledge, be living on 
an Indian Reservation. The Court did not find these arguments persuasive. Regarding the 
majority of convictions, Justice Gorsuch wrote that the vast majority of convictions will not 
be affected, and the “thousands” of convictions the State is concerned about is speculative. 
The State did not produce information on how many convictions were at stake, and “many 
defendants may choose to finish their state sentences rather than risk reprosecution in federal 
court where sentences can be graver”.36 Additionally, the State’s “dire warning” does not 
provide a “license for us to disregard the law”.37 Instead, “the magnitude of a legal wrong is 
no reason to perpetuate it”.38 If problems arise from this decision, then tribes can work with 
states and enter into agreements with them to overcome them, and “should agreement prove 
elusive, Congress remains free to supplement its statutory directions about the lands in 
question at any time”.39 
Essentially, the Court held that the State of Oklahoma (as well as the dissenters) did not point 
to any Congressional language disestablishing the Reservation. Therefore, the Creek 
Reservation still exists. Justice Gorsuch wrote:40  
To determine whether a tribe continues to hold a reservation, there is only one place 
we may look: the Acts of Congress … [T]he Legislature wields significant 
constitutional authority when it comes to tribal relations, possessing even the 
authority to breach its own promises and treaties … But that power, this Court has 
cautioned, belongs to Congress alone.  
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States cannot reduce federal reservations, as that would be unconstitutional, and neither can 
courts.41 As such, because the Creek Reservation has not been disestablished, only the 
Federal government has jurisdiction to prosecute Mr McGirt under the MCA.  
Justice Gorsuch ends the Court’s decision with a compelling final paragraph:42 
The federal government promised the Creek a reservation in perpetuity. Over time, 
Congress has diminished that reservation … But Congress has never withdrawn the 
promised reservation. As a result, many of the arguments before us today follow a 
sadly familiar pattern. Yes, promises were made, but the price of keeping them has 
become too great, so now we should just cast a blind eye. We reject that thinking. 
If Congress wishes to withdraw its promises, it must say so. Unlawful acts, 
performed long enough and with sufficient vigor, are never enough to amend the 
law. To hold otherwise would be to elevate the most brazen and longstanding 
injustices over the law, both rewarding wrong and failing those in the right. 
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent (Justices Alito, Kavanaugh and Thomas joining) seeks to 
convince readers that the Court’s decision employs questionable legal interpretive 
methodologies. The dissent believes the Court has hobbled the prosecution of serious crimes, 
will require convictions to be thrown out, and “unbeknownst to anyone for the past century, a 
huge swathe of Oklahoma is actually a Creek Indian reservation”.43 For Roberts, the truth is 
simple: “What has gone unquestioned for a century remains true today: A huge portion of 
Oklahoma is not a Creek Indian reservation.”44 For the dissent, wars fought between tribes 
and the United States were followed by settlement and the establishment of the State of 
Oklahoma, which dismantled tribal governments and extinguished the Creek Nation’s title to 
the lands.45 The dissenters declare:46  
… Congress made no secret of its intentions. It created a commission tasked with 
extinguishing the Five Tribes’ territory and, in one report after another, explained 
that it was creating a homogenous population led by a common government. 
Under this view, allotment and the processes of state-formation disestablished the 
Reservation. In adopting this purposive approach, the dissent accuses the Court of “viewing 
each of the statutes enacted by Congress in a vacuum”.47  No sole act disestablished the 
Creek Reservation, but “all of the relevant Acts of Congress together, viewed in light of 
contemporaneous and subsequent contextual evidence, demonstrate Congress’s intent to 
disestablish the reservation”.48 Roberts continues, “there is no ‘magic words’ requirement for 
disestablishment”, and “we recognize that the language Congress uses to accomplish its 
objective is adapted to the circumstances it confronts”.49 Allotment sought to integrate the 
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Creek Nation within a new political community, the state of Oklahoma, which terminated the 
Reservation.50 With this integration, Oklahoma had grounds for prosecuting McGirt. 
The dissent believes there are several reasons why it is a “fantasy” that Congress did not 
“complete” disestablishment.51 It considered Congressional intention and Tribal 
understandings of Congress’s intent by pointing to evidence produced by the Dawes 
Commission. There, some tribal representatives believed that allotment sought to “wipe out 
the line of political distinction between an Indian citizen and others”.52 Additionally, for the 
dissent, the Court assumes that the State “overstepped its authority” in prosecuting cases that 
should have been under federal jurisdiction.53 However, the dissent views that stance as 
problematically undermining the presumption that government officials comply with the law, 
and the dissent found it difficult to believe that the Tribes never raised this issue.54 Lastly, 
considering the subsequent treatment of the area in question, the State’s unquestioned 
exercise of jurisdiction “confirms that the Creek reservation did not survive statehood”.55 To 
support this view, the dissent cites Felix Cohen (original author of the Handbook of Federal 
Indian Law),56 tribal leaders, as well as precedent saying that the Creek Reservation no longer 
exists or there are “‘former’ lands of the Creek Nation”.57 Lastly, the dissent is concerned 
with the “thousands” of State prosecutions for major crimes that the Court downplays.58 
Justice Thomas joined the dissent but authored a sole opinion to point out that the federal 
court does not have jurisdiction to review adequate and independent state criminal matters 
when the matters were not raised at trial.59 
Discussion 
There are many interesting aspects of this very complex case. McGirt is remarkable, in part, 
because it occurred within a United States context that is mired in racial injustices stemming 
from overt as well as structural racism and policing. That context, however, is not addressed 
in McGirt. Justice Gorsuch’s decision for the Court does not address any context. The 
decision is pure textualism. “Extratextual” evidence about the context of those acts, the 
purposes they seek to effect, Congress’s intention, or how Tribes understand them is, simply, 
irrelevant. If Gorsuch’s textualist approach is followed in subsequent cases, it will be a 
departure from the approach established in previous reservation boundary cases.60 
Unquestionably, texts are centrally important for contemporary legal practice. An ongoing 
debate that extends far beyond Federal Indian Law or United States borders is the ‘proper’ 
approach or method of legal interpretation. Should we only examine the text, and upon 
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discovering an ambiguity then consider context, purpose, or use? Instead of canvassing the 
multiple views, I merely consider Matthew Fletcher’s theorisation of Indian law textualism.61    
McGirt demonstrates that textualism has the potential to benefit Mr McGirt (assuming that 
the outcome of the Federal prosecution is favourable to him), the Creek Nation (assuming 
that United States recognition of the Reservation has positive changes or effects), and, as the 
State of Oklahoma worries, other tribes that seek to enforce treaty promises. Despite those 
potential benefits, there is a problem with textualism. Fletcher argues that a textualist 
interpretation “will see judges prioritize the public understanding of the privileged white men 
in power at the time of the framing of the … text”.62 The real problem here is that textualism 
is paired in opposition to purposivism, which fails to provide a meaningful alternative. Under 
a purposive approach, one will see “judges engage with the legislative history of the statute, 
[and] they will engage with the public understanding of the legislations who enacted the law, 
again, largely privileged white men”.63 The dissent demonstrates how a purposive approach 
would operate to the detriment of Mr McGirt, the Creek Nation and potential other tribes. It 
centralises the views of the “largely privileged white men” (and Roberts demonstrates how to 
centralise those views and use citations from tribal representatives’ fears about United States 
intentions to do so) and, in effect, it would undermine Mr McGirt’s claims. In short, whether 
textualism or purposivism, the interpretive method will reflect the “public understanding” of 
“privileged white men”.64 
However, Fletcher argues that textualism and purposivism do not fill the field of potential 
interpretive methods. For Fletcher, McGirt misses a crucial interpretation. That is, it does not 
consider:65  
… how the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, its citizens, and perhaps most importantly, 
its local governments (known as tribal towns) understood the relevant texts … [I]t 
seems relevant, even potentially dispositive, that the tribal towns continued 
governing as if nothing had changed during the entire history of the federal 
government’s termination of the tribe’s national government. 
To be clear, McGirt re-asserts the Kagama/Lone Wolf approach that Congress has plenary 
authority over Tribes (so it can unilaterally alter or abrogate Treaties). Despite the finding 
that the Creek Reservation still exists, it confirms that Tribes are subjects of Congress’s 
Plenary power, rather than sovereign equals or partners. But within this system, Fletcher’s 
method may provide a potential corrective:66  
One important first step, and perhaps the biggest step, is to acknowledge as a matter 
of law that Indian tribes are domestic sovereigns that participate in federal 
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legislative processes, usually initiating and later guiding Congress’s Indian affairs 
enactments.  
Regarding statutory interpretation, Fletcher would “require the judiciary in every case in 
which an Indian affairs text is being interpreted to consider how affected Indians and tribes 
understand the meaning of that text”.67 
While Justice Gorsuch has previously “relied exclusively on evidence of the understanding of 
that treaty by the Indians who negotiated that treaty, and representations made by those on the 
American side consistent with the Indian understanding”,68 he did not in McGirt. This 
indicates several things. Even if McGirt is a positive outcome and is a slight departure from 
the approach established in previous cases, the Court has not embraced a consistent method. 
Crucially, it does not consistently consider how affected tribes view and interpret statutes (not 
just treaties). McGirt is a significant case for establishing that the Muscogee Creek 
Reservation was not disestablished. Therefore, the Federal government has jurisdiction for 
major crimes that occur on Muscogee Creek Reservation under the MCA, and the State of 
Oklahoma does not. Without a consistent method that considers the views of affected tribes 
that is entirely consonant with Kagama/Lone Wolf, it is unclear how other tribes can use this 
reasoning to their benefit. McGirt may represent a new direction for the Court. Time will tell 
whether it is, in fact, “one of the most important Supreme Court cases of all time”. 
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